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Part I – Introduction. 
 In the well-known Biblical story, the faithful, attempting to create a place of 
unity for themselves, set about building the Tower of Babel, only to see the Tower 
implode due to linguistic differences and power assertions.1 The end result of efforts 
based in faith and mutual belief was utter destruction of the shared dream and goal, and 
all of those involved in the Tower’s attempted building were relegated to the same failure 
despite their best intentions and communal support.2
Thousands of years later, the world is still plagued by sectarian strife and warfare.  
Indeed, the situation has only become more involved since Babel, as there are now inter-
communal and intra-communal conflicts for supremacy and superiority – a notable 
difference in these conflicts is that the ultimate tool of getting to Heaven is no longer a 
tower, it is now a state.  Within the framework of the much-vaunted and highly-contested 
state structure which sits at the heart of inter-communal and intra-communal conflicts lies 
a duality of politics and law. A state cannot exist without political actors, whatever their 
motivations may be, and political actors of all belief systems have embraced the need for 
laws as a method of control – if not equality and a means of assuring an open society. 
 For Christian communities in the Middle East there is perhaps no greater a living 
symbol of the effects of Babel-esque intra-communal fighting than Lebanon. The fighting 
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2between Christian communities in Lebanon,3 and the alliances of these communities with 
various Muslim communities and other nations to try to crush rival Christian opposition,4
is more than just a memory of decades past; it continues today, albeit in slightly less 
violent forms than during the civil war which ravaged the country for over a decade.5 By 
contrast, the political and legal standing of Christian communities across the border in 
Syria is nowhere near as visible, or publicized, as their Lebanese co-religionists.6
However, lack of visibility does not correlate to lack of existence, and indeed there are 
many historical Christian communities within Syria.7 Disturbingly, at a time when many 
see the Middle East as an area that is unquestionably Muslim in character, and when Arab 
scholars themselves write on the topic of creating a symbiosis between democracy and 
Islam8 while ignoring the existence of other salient groups in the democratic debate mix,9
Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria appear to be phased out of public discourse. 
Yet there is perhaps no more vital a time for these communities to come to the forefront 
of the political and legal lives of their nations than at the present, as the future 
composition of the Middle East lies in the balance, and with it the future rights of these 
communities. 
 
3 See infra Parts II. A.II. B. 
4 See infra Parts II. A.II. B. 
5 See infra Parts II. D, III. D. 
6 See infra Part III. A. 
7 See infra Part III. A. 
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3Part II of this article will discuss the Lebanese situation.10 This part starts with a 
description of the Christian communities in Lebanon, including their relationships with 
larger churches throughout the world.11 Discussion then turns to the political history of 
Lebanon since the nation’s founding - with the promulgation of its constitution - in 
1926,12 which necessarily includes the Christian communities.13 Emphasis will be placed 
on the intra-communal relationships during the last civil war (1975 - 1991)14 and its 
aftermath,15 as well as the growth of Islamist groups in Lebanon and their effect on the 
global perception of Lebanon as a political actor.16 After this historical discussion, the 
article will present the Lebanese constitutional law, as well as statutory law in the form of 
electoral law, personal status law, property law, and criminal law.17 These laws will be 
analyzed in terms of their plain language meanings and practical implications in a 
country which has varied widely from the tenets of the rule of law and the guarantees 
enshrined in its constitution despite having had a continual constitutional apparatus since 
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existing constitutional law provisions in Lebanon and Syria based on her belief in the need for 
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41926.18 Part II will close with the author’s call for unity among Lebanese Christian 
communities as a way to ensure political stability,19 enshrine legal rights for Christians in 
Lebanon which do not mirror those applied to Christians in other Muslim communities 
(or the dhimmi patterns used in the Ottoman Empire),20 and give Lebanese Christians a 
greater role in the control of their country.21 It will be argued that these suggestions will 
not only strengthen the Christian communities, and Lebanon itself, but will also 
strengthen Lebanese Muslim communities which are currently facing an uneasy choice 
between terrorist group affiliation and a peaceful civil society.22 Unity among Lebanon’s 
Christian communities will also invite confidence from the United States and its allies in 
the global war on terror, which would serve to bolster the ability of the Lebanese state to 
be a reliable and functional ally rather than a Syrian pawn.23 
Part III of this article will discuss the Syrian situation.24 The available information 
on Christian communities in Syria is not on par with the information available about the 
Lebanese Christian communities, hence the initial background discussion of the Syrian 
Christian communities will be brief.25 Part III will turn from the Syrian Christian 
communities themselves to the history of Syria since its independence in 1926, with an 
emphasis on its cross-border role in Lebanon.26 A discussion of Syrian constitutional law, 
as well as statutory law in the form of election law, personal status law, and the effect of 
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5decades old emergency law will then ensue.27 As in Part II, the legal analysis will 
emphasize the real, pragmatic state of Syrian law rather than the esoteric or plain 
meaning of the Syrian constitution.28 The conclusion of Part III will be the author’s call 
for Syrian Christians – those in Syria and those who have emigrated – along with 
Lebanese Christians to use the increasingly dire situation of the Assad regime in Syria to 
push for legal reform for Syrian Christians and Syrians as a whole.29 This call comes with 
the caveat that domestic agitation might be too risky to attempt at present,30 but will 
highlight that, if Lebanese Christian communities were to follow the author’s 
recommendations in Part II, the situation and bargaining power of Syrian Christians 
would likely increase as a result.31 
Finally, Part IV will summarize the conclusions and recommendations in Parts II 
and III for Lebanon and Syria.32 Part IV will emphasize that from the pieces of Christian 
communities in Lebanon and Syria which have been ravaged by both internal and 
external forces, it is possible to resurrect the modern Babel and fashion, if not a tower to 
Heaven, at the very least two states which celebrate their shared faiths rather than their 
devastating divisions.33 
Part II – Lebanon. 
A. Christian Communities in Lebanon 
 The officially recognized Christian communities in Lebanon include the 
Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Roman Catholics, 
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6Syrian Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Orthodox Melkites, and forms 
of Protestantism.34 These communities have a long history with Lebanon,35 and were part 
of the Ottoman governing system of allowing millets – groups of non-Islamic, or non-
Arabic as the case might be, peoples – to live within the confines of the Ottoman Empire 
in exchange for a lower social status and payments from the millet leaders to the Ottoman 
regime.36 As fellow believers in God and “the book,” Christian communities were also 
protected by the Ottomans because of their status as dhimmi – believers who did not 
convert to Islam but nevertheless worshiped God and a holy book.37 
Throughout the growth and development of Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and the areas 
which comprise modern-day Lebanon, the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox became the 
paramount groups in the Christian power structure38; the Maronites came to control the 
Mountain,39 and the Greek Orthodox extended more control over Beirut.40 Politically, 
these groups have stood the test of time and continue to be the most influential Christian 
communities in Lebanon,41 although in the author’s opinion all of the Christian 
communities have gained in status – extant or potential – in the wake of the civil war and 
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of the Maronites in the mountain and the Greek Orthodox and other communities which had established 
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7the current war on terrorism taking place in the Middle East. This is so because many of 
the traditional leaders in the Maronite community in particular were killed or forced into 
exile by the civil war,42 and recent polling data indicates that many of the remaining 
Christian political leaders in general are tainted in the eyes of Lebanese Christians 
because of their dependence upon and affiliation with Syria.43 In this situation, it is 
politically feasible that a member of any Christian community, with the right grass-roots 
support and personality, could emerge as a future leader of a block of united Lebanese 
Christian communities, provided that the political and legal reality of the need for unity is 
understood and achieved.44 After all, the presence of Maronites and other Christian 
groups in Lebanon has historically been such that, at its founding, many Lebanese 
considered the nation to be rightfully Christian.45 
42 See KHALAF, supra note 39, at 54 (2002) (“While all other communities appear to enjoy uncontested 
leaders or spokesmen, the Maronites seem leaderless, splintered and bereft of compelling voices apart 
perhaps from the Patriarch.”); Simon Haddad, The Christians of Lebanon in the context of a [sic] Syrian-
Israeli political relations, J. SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 589 (2001) (recounting polling 
results in which many Lebanese Christians reported that they were not pleased with the political leaders 
who had survived the civil war and remain active in Lebanese politics). 
43 Haddad, supra note 42 (explaining that most powerful Christian politicians are tainted by their 
affiliations with Syria and stating that “[n]early 84% of the respondents [who were all Lebanese Christians] 
do not feel that their ruling elites work in the best interest of the people.”); see also id. (stating that, 
although disenchantment with and distrust of the Lebanese government and the individuals who comprise it 
is prevalent among all religious communities, it is most prevalent among Lebanese Christians per se). 
44 For a discussion of the increasing trend of confessional identification among Lebanese today, see 
KHALAF, supra note 39, at 27 (“[M]ore and more Lebanese today are brandishing their confessionalism, if 
we may invoke a dual metaphor, as both emblem and armor: Emblem, because confessional identity has 
become the most viable medium for asserting presence and securing vital needs and benefits. . . Armor, 
because it has become a shield against real or imagined threats. The more vulnerable the emblem, the 
thicker the armor.”); see also Ahmad Beydoun, Confessionalism: Outline of an Announced Reform in 
OPTIONS FOR LEBANON 85 (Nawaf Salam ed. 2004) (describing the effect of the civil war on self-
identification with a confessional community in Lebanon). It is the author’s opinion that this trend will only 
continue in the face of increased instability in the Middle East generally, and particularly in light of the 
Hariri investigation and the steadily more public debate over the appropriate role of Syria in Lebanese 
political life. 
45 See Rania Maktabi, The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese, 26 Brit. J. Middle 
Eastern Studs. 219, 224, 224 n. 9 (1999); WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 66-67 (describing the motivations of 
early Lebanese Republic founders viz. religion and the state). 
8To understand how this unity is possible in terms of beliefs as well as pragmatic 
politics, it is important to examine briefly the doctrinal beliefs of several Christian groups 
and their historical places in Lebanon. 
1. The Maronites 
 Founded as a separate religious group, the Maronites are currently one of the 
many Uniate Churches affiliated with Roman Catholicism through a sworn allegiance to 
the Pope.46 Maronites have claimed shelter in Mount Lebanon for well over a thousand 
years, were involved in the Crusades at various points in time,47 and were rewarded with 
the 1584 founding of the Maronite College in Rome.48 The Maronite College still exists 
today,49 as does the role of the Maronite clergy as religious and political leaders within 
Lebanon.50 
With historical longevity on its side, the Maronite Church in Lebanon has 
continued to be a political force.51 Maronites were vehement that Lebanon be founded on 
the principle of having a Christian majority after independence was achieved in 1943.52 
However, at the time of the creation of the Lebanese constitution, which was in essence 
the founding of the modern Lebanese Republic,53 and in the years afterward when 
citizenship and voting rights became paramount issues in the political and legal power 
 
46 Gemayel, supra note 34. 
47 Gemayel, supra note 34. Interestingly, some of the Muslim civil war opponents of the Maronites in 
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48 Gemayel, supra note 34; HOURANI, supra note 20, at 242. 
49 Gemayel, supra note 34. 
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(1979). 
51 See Maktabi, supra note 45, at 227; WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 67; BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON,
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52 See Maktabi, supra note 45. 
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9structure of Lebanon,54 the Maronites and other Christian communities took a pragmatic 
view of the need to buffer the Christian communities as a whole, consenting to the 
extension of citizenship rights to members of other Christian communities who had 
emigrated.55 
Due to the potential contentiousness that a religion-based census could bring to 
Lebanon, an official census has not been released since the 1932 census which was used 
to create the legislative apportionment scheme of seats as 6 Christian seats for every 5 
Muslim seats in the Lebanese Parliament.56 However, the total estimated Christian 
population in Lebanon is approximately 1.48 million, representing the estimate that 
Christians comprise approximately 39% of the Lebanese population as of mid-2005.57 In 
this context, it is important to note the toll that the 1975-1991 civil war took on the 
Christian communities in Lebanon as a whole. It has been estimated that roughly 950,000 
people fled Lebanon during the decades of the war, approximately two-thirds of whom 
were Christians.58 It is also estimated that roughly two-thirds of the Lebanese who fled 
during the civil war and have chosen not to return to Lebanon to date are Christians of 
 
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 This apportionment system, as well as the confessional apportionment system used for the top 
governmental positions in Lebanon, was part of the National Pact, an unwritten agreement which was in 
effect until the end of the civil war. See BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14. 
57 See Maktabi, supra note 45; LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14; BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra 
note 14. It is important to remember that the population percentages do not necessarily correspond to 
citizenship status and voting rights figures, as Palestinian refugees who can be counted as Lebanese 
inhabitants are not granted citizenship rights and cannot vote in Lebanon. See id.; see also Haddad, supra 
note 42 (describing the position of Palestinians in Lebanese society and their relationship with Lebanese 
Christians). 
58 M. Joseph Khoreich, Results of the Lebanese War 1975-1997, CENTRE CATHOLIQUE D’INFORMATION 
(trans. Dr. Georges Kallas) available at http://www.opuslibani.org/lb/Lebanon/dos013.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2005); see also TOUFIC K. GASPARD, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEBANON 1948 – 2002: THE 
LIMITS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 97 (2004)(providing non-religiously based emigration figures for Lebanon from 
1900 to 1974; these figures show an upswing in emigration starting from the 1970 – 1974 period). 
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some denomination.59 All Christian denominations in Lebanon are or have been active in 
the propagation of religious orders in Lebanon, and/or the maintenance of hospitals, 
schools, and charitable institutions as well.60 Many of these institutions, especially 
schools, were damaged or destroyed in the war,61 yet still carry on today as integral parts 
of the community. Indeed, with the exception of the American University of Beirut,62 the 
best known universities in Lebanon are at least affiliated with Christianity.63 
Due to their preeminent status among the Lebanese Christian communities, the 
Maronites have enjoyed the guarantee that the President of Lebanon will always be a 
Maronite.64 The only other groups so privileged are the Sunnis, who are guaranteed the 
Prime Minister’s spot in any Lebanese government,65 and the Shi’is, who are guaranteed 
the slot of the President of the Lebanese Parliament.66 
During the civil war, by far the greatest number of Christian combatant groups 
were Maronites;67 indeed, although the Lebanese national Kata’ib party was founded on 
the idea of a Christian state in Lebanon,68 it ultimately eschewed a Maronite identity and 
became associated with the Maronite-dominated Phalanges party and its militant 
 
59 Khoreich, supra note 58. 
60 KHALAF, supra note 39, at 281 (providing a brief account of the role of Christian religious orders in the 
early founding of Lebanese educational institutions). 
61 See Khoreich, supra note 58.  
62 The American University of Beirut is administered under the auspices of the State University of New 
York. See ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT, available at 
http://www.aub.edu/about/about.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005). 
63 See GASPARD, supra note 58, at 46 (describing the founding of several influential religious-based 
universities in Lebanon, especially at the behest of the Jesuits and Lazarists). 
64 This is one of the provisions of the National Pact which remains in effect today. See BACKGROUND NOTE 
LEBANON, supra note 14. 
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 192 – 193; JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 36 – 37. 
68 WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 193 – 194; JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 36 – 37, 150 – 151. 
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groups.69 While the civil war raged, so too did the internal divisions within the Maronite 
community – particularly within the groups established by former notable Maronite 
families.70 Ultimately, these divisions would provide an opening for both Syria and Israel 
to enter the conflict and add their own agendas to the war and the peace which 
followed.71 
Despite the ravages of war, the Maronites have managed to maintain their 
permanent hold on the Presidency, and have also maintained the majority apportionment 
of Christian seats in the Lebanese Parliament even after the Ta’if Agreement (officially 
known as the Charter of Lebanese National Reconciliation72) altered the apportionment 
of seats in the Parliament so that there would be absolute parity between Christians and 
Muslims.73 However, neither the Ta’if provisions nor the constitutional enshrinement of 
religion-based awarding of key governmental posts has been enough to stop violence 
carried out against Christian targets and in Christian neighborhoods, most recently in the 
form of bombings.74 
69 WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 193 – 194; KHALAF, supra note 39, at 230 (describing the escalation of 
Maronite, and particularly Kata’ib, militarization and mobilization in the face of the initial events which 
ultimately lead to the civil war); Id. at 241 (describing the various combination of sectarian allies and 
enemies during the course of the civil war). 
70 WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 193 – 194; Id. at 221 – 230; KHALIFDI, supra note 50, at 68 – 72 (1979); 
EYAL ZISSER, LEBANON: THE CHALLENGE OF INDEPENDENCE 10 – 12, 17 - 21 (2000). 
71 See WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 199 – 200, 218 – 224; KHALIDI, supra note 50, at 139 – 143 (describing 
the process in which escalating hostilities between Syria and Israel were played out through the actions of 
these countries, and their designated agents, in Lebanon). 
72 LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14. 
73 KHALAF, supra note 39, at 54 (describing the impact of this parity on the psyche of the Christian and 
Muslim communities). Currently, Maronites hold 34 of the 128 seats in Parliament. See LOI ELECTORAL 
PARLEMENTAIRE, TABLEAU 1 – LES SIEGES PARLEMENTAIRE DANS LES CIRCONSCRIPTIONS ELECTORALE 
(Electoral law, Table 1 – parliamentary seats in the electoral districts), REPUBLIQUE LIBANAISE ASSEMBLEE 
NATIONALE, available at http://www.lp.gov.lb/Version%20Francaise/Loi/table1.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 
2005). 
74 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 246 – 249 (describing Syrian attempts to intimidate non-
cooperative groups in Lebanon in the aftermath of Syrian attempts to increase local and national control 
from 2000 onward). 
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2. The Greek Orthodox 
 The Greek Orthodox Church in Lebanon traces its origins to the early years of 
Christianity.75 As a separate entity from Roman Catholicism, and not part of the Uniate 
Churches, the Greek Orthodox population is not affiliated with the Vatican, although 
recent popes and patriarchs have made overtures which indicate that all sides are willing 
to attempt to breach the schism which divided the churches initially.76 While the 
Maronites primarily gathered on Mount Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox became 
increasingly urban, especially during the nineteenth-century, when many Greek Orthodox 
became traders, merchants and bankers.77 
As mentioned above, the Greek Orthodox represent the second largest Christian 
community in Lebanon, and have historically held this position.78 There are no 
governmental positions guaranteed to the Greek Orthodox community under the National 
Pact,79 although the community has been apportioned fourteen seats in the Lebanese 
Parliament since the Ta’if Agreement.80 Despite the lack of a guarantee for the holding of 
certain positions, the Greek Orthodox clergy and leadership still wield tremendous 
influence within the community.81 
75 It should be remembered that the Orthodox Church per se did not exist until Christianity was well 
established in the Middle East.  
76 See Catholics, Orthodox trying to mend rift, THE BROCKVILLE RECORDER AND TIMES (ONTARIO), Oct. 
29, 2005 at A9; Nicole Winfield, Vatican seeks full diplomatic ties with Russia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 
27, 2005. 
77 ZISSER, supra note 70, at 61. 
78 Id. at 8 – 9. 
79 Id. at 60; see BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14. 
80 LOI ELECTORAL PARLEMENTAIRE, TABLEAU 1 – LES SIEGES PARLEMENTAIRE DANS LES CIRCONSCRIPTIONS 
ELECTORALE (Electoral law, Table 1 – parliamentary seats in the electoral districts), REPUBLIQUE 
LIBANAISE ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, available at 
http://www.lp.gov.lb/Version%20Francaise/Loi/table1.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005); see also 
BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14. 
81 See Haddad, supra note 42 (describing the anti-Syrian actions of the Greek Orthodox Archbishop Elias 
Audi during a period of anti-Syrian agitation in 2000; Archbishop Audi went so far as to use a Palm 
Sunday homily to deliver a message of support for anti-Syrian activists). 
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 In the civil war years, the Christian communities in Lebanon fought not only 
within their own sects, but also with their co-religionists. Maronites and Greek Orthodox 
fought each other,82 as well as other Christians and Muslims,83 in a war which, although it 
began as a religious war in name, ultimately blurred confessionalism with pragmatic 
alliances and, in the process, undermined the cohesion of the Lebanese Christian 
communities. In and of itself, this was dangerous enough for Lebanese Christians, 
however media coverage of the war, which tended to portray the conflict as between 
Muslims and Christians, or Israelis and Arabs, created and perpetuated an understanding 
of the politics of the region which is oversimplified, easily manipulated, and ongoing into 
present-day media and international societal understandings. 
3. Other Christian communities 
 With the exception of the Protestant groups represented in Lebanon, the 
remaining Christian communities are either part of the Uniate church umbrella linking 
them to Roman Catholicism,84 Roman Catholic themselves,85 or various forms of 
Orthodox churches.86 Although these communities do not have the numerical strength of 
the Maronites or Greek Orthodox,87 they nevertheless have long standing historical ties to 
Lebanon, and are an integral part of Lebanese society. 
 
82 See KHALIDI, supra note 50, at 75 – 78 (describing the range of political groupings adopted by the Greek 
Orthodox and other Christian communities during the civil war, including those which openly opposed 
Maronite and Muslim hegemony in Lebanon); JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 150 – 151, 160 – 161; ZISSER,
supra note 70, at 177 – 186 (providing background on the tensions between factions of the Maronite and 
Greek Orthodox communities as they emerged in the founding of the Syrian Nationalist Party (or PPS) in 
Lebanon by, among others, a Lebanese Greek Orthodox). 
83 KHALIDI, supra note 50, at 75. 
84 LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14. 
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Although there are no official census figures available, a rough estimate of the populations of these 
groups can be inferred from the number of Parliamentary seats apportioned to each group. See LOI 
ELECTORAL PARLEMENTAIRE, TABLEAU 1 – LES SIEGES PARLEMENTAIRE DANS LES CIRCONSCRIPTIONS 
ELECTORALE (Electoral law, Table 1 – parliamentary seats in the electoral districts), REPUBLIQUE 
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 These communities were involved in, and damaged by, the civil war; indeed it can 
be argued that the damage sustained by these communities was perhaps more than the 
majority communities, as the plight of the majority communities, however misidentified 
as the plight of “Christians” or “Arabs” in general, was more visible to the world. In an 
electoral sense, these communities have regained at least some measure of status under 
the current Christian Parliamentary apportionment system.88 
B. Lebanese Creation and Strife 
 Lebanon’s status changed dramatically in the early twentieth century, starting out 
as part of the rapidly declining Ottoman Empire,89 then becoming a French mandate after 
the cessation of World War I,90 promulgating a constitution in 1926,91 and eventually 
achieving its own independence in 1943.92 When Lebanon was created it was an enigma, 
the first Christian-associated nation in the Middle East at the time. Although known for 
its confessional status, the original Lebanese constitution eschewed confessionalism, 
declaring that there would be religious freedom and tolerance for all.93 
Like most enigmas, particularly those dependent on politics and law to perpetuate 
their status, Lebanon’s myth was soon subsumed by the reality of inter-confessional 
divisions which threatened the future of the young nation. In 1943, these divisions 
resulted in the National Pact - an unwritten agreement between various powerful political 
 
LIBANAISE ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, available at 
http://www.lp.gov.lb/Version%20Francaise/Loi/table1.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005). At present, 
excluding Maronite and Greek Orthodox seats, there are 15 “other” Christian seats in the Lebanese 
Parliament. See id.
88 See id.
89 See BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14. 
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 The current Lebanese constitution still retains these protections. See infra Part II.C. (discussing Lebanese 
constitutional and statutory law, with emphasis on personal status law). 
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leaders of religious communities - that created the 6 Christian/5 Muslim Parliamentary 
seat apportionment system94 which would remain in effect until the Ta’if Agreement.95 
The National Pact also enshrined the permanent assignment of the Presidency of the 
Lebanese Republic to a Maronite, the position of Prime Minister to a Sunni, and the 
President of the Lebanese Parliament to a Shi’ia.96 
The reasons asserted for the increasing tensions in Lebanon in the years from the 
creation of the National Pact through the next incidence of civil strife in 1958,97 and 
culminating in the civil war are myriad: the increasing influence of Israel and Palestinian 
refugees relocated to Lebanon98; the rising influence of Syria in Lebanon’s domestic 
politics and in the international world99; the increasing number of Muslims in the country, 
coupled with Lebanon’s status as the only Christian country in the otherwise Muslim 
Middle East100; the changing social and economic milieu of the country101; the difficulties 
in trying to establish a pan-Arab culture with sectarian differences102; the list goes on. 
What comes out of these explanations is not only a muddied understanding of the 
situation; rather, the disconnect between the laws and principles enshrined in legal 
documents and discourse and the meaning of these laws and principles in reality becomes 
vividly real. 
 
94 See BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14. 
95 ZISSER, supra note 70, at 60 – 67. 
96 Id.
97 See BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14. 
98 See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 42. 
99 See BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14. 
100 See, e.g. id.
101 See generally GASPARD, supra note 58 (discussing the changing economic situation in Lebanon from 
independence onwards, and the impact of this change on the social makeup of the Lebanese). 
102 See generally ZISSER, supra note 70 (discussing the creation of the PPS); infra Part III (discussing the 
rise of the Ba’athist movement in Syria and its goals). 
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 This disconnect reached new heights during the civil war,103 when law as such 
was ineffective, and even customary communal laws – such as respect for notable 
families,104 respect for elders and women,105 and the observance of standard social tenets 
grounded in religious teachings, i.e. that killing is illegal and against God’s 
commandments106 – were cast aside in an escalating cycle of violence and hatred.107 The 
disconnect was thus nearly complete. 
 Once peace arrived through the Ta’if Agreement,108 which is widely held to be a 
compromise document created at the behest of foreign governments – particularly 
Syria109 – the words of law were again meant to solidify the Lebanese state, though this 
time at the cost of significant legislative powers for the Christian communities as a 
whole.  
C. Lebanese Constitutional and Statutory Law 
1. Lebanese Constitutional Law 
 
103 A discussion of the causes of the Lebanese civil war is outside the scope of this article, and indeed this 
has been the subject of many books and articles. For accounts of the causes of the civil war in Lebanon, see 
generally JOHNSON, supra note 38; KHALAF, supra note 39; BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14, 
LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14. 
104 For a discussion of the splits between Christian groups which evinced a disregard for the established 
leadership and primacy of notables, see supra Part II.A. 
105 For an account of the horrific and ritualistic violence carried out against women, children, and the 
elderly by all sides during the war, see generally JOHNSON, supra note 38 (positing that these crimes were 
perpetrated because of the role that women in particular served in all religious groups within Lebanese 
society – namely that of the repository of the male community’s honor). 
106 This is perhaps the most elemental of the Ten Commandments, and also carries over into Islam, 
regardless of the legal penalties placed on killing by a statutory law-based society. 
107 For an account of the escalating brutalities committed during the war, see generally JOHNSON, supra 
note 38; see also BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14. 
108 See BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14; KHALAF, supra note 39, at 54. 
109 See KHALAF, supra note 39, at 54 (detailing the Ta’if Agreement’s requirement that Syrian troops be 
stationed in Lebanon in the aftermath of the Agreement’s implementation and a later interpretation of the 
Agreement to allow for the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon until certain milestones in 
Syrian/Lebanese/Israeli relations are met). 
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 The original Lebanese constitution was promulgated in 1926,110 and has been 
amended on multiple occasions.111 In the aftermath of the civil war, a new constitutional 
preamble was inserted, providing in relevant part that: Lebanon is “sovereign, free, and 
independent,” for the benefit of all of its “children,” inside the borders recognized by the 
international community112; Lebanon is Arab in its identity113; the Lebanese economic 
system is open and guarantees individual rights and private property114; and that “the 
suppression of confessionalism in politics constitutes an essential practice for the 
nation.”115 Title one, chapter two of the constitution provides that all Lebanese are to be 
considered for public employment without regard to factors other than their individual 
merit and qualifications, as well as other factors dictated by law.116 Chapter two also 
protects private property from a governmental taking without reason and 
compensation.117 
Contrary to the goals of the preamble, Title two, Chapter two provides that 
apportionment for parliamentary seats is to be made initially on an equal division 
between Christians and Muslims,118 with these seats subdivided by region119 and by sect 
within each religion and region.120 Currently, the Lebanese Parliament is comprised of 
128 seats,121 of which 64 are designated as Christian seats and 64 as Muslim seats. 
 
110 LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14. 
111 Summaries of past amendments to the Lebanese constitution are available from the Lebanese 
Parliament. See LA CONSTITUTION LIBANAISE, REPUBLIQUE LIBANAISE ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, available 
at http://www.lp.gov.lb/Version%20Francaise/constitution.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005). 
112 LEB. CONST. PREAMBLE, TIT. 1 (A) (2005) 
113 Id. (B) 
114 Id. (F) 
115 Id. (H). 
116 LEB. CONST. TIT. 1 CH. 2 ART. 12 (2005). 
117 Id. at art. 15. 
118 LEB. CONST. TIT. 2 CH. 2 ART. 24 (a) (2005). 
119 Id. (c). 
120 Id. (b). 
121 LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14. 
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Interestingly, despite the apportionment system used, the constitution goes on to state that 
each Member of Parliament (“MP”) is a member for the nation rather than his own 
constituency, and must act accordingly in performing the duties of his office.122 
The President of Lebanon is largely a figurehead under constitutional law, albeit it 
a confessionally selected figurehead. His powers as commander-in-chief are subsumed by 
the powers of the Council of Ministers,123 and technically his term is limited to one 
consecutive term,124 although past and present attempts to thwart this provision have been 
made.125 The President signs laws into effect, although he does not possess the ability to 
change laws promulgated by Parliament126; in terms of foreign policy, both the President 
and the Prime Minister must sign treaties into law for them to be legally binding.127 The 
Prime Minister is named by the President with the consent of Parliament.128 The primary 
executive function of the Lebanese government is carried out by the Council of Ministers, 
which is comprised of MPs elevated to ministerial status.129 
2. Statutory Law 
A. Electoral Laws 
 
122 LEB. CONST. TIT. 2 CH 3 ART. 27 (2005). 
123 Id.
124 Id.; Jean Naffah, Administrative Law in THE LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM vol. I 60(Antoine El-Gemayel 
ed. 1985).  
125 Most recently, controversy over extending the presidency of Emile LaHoud for a second term caused a 
rift between the Syrian regime and Lebanese leaders, key among them former prime minister Rafiki Hariri. 
According to press accounts at the time, and the preliminary findings of the United Nations committee 
charged with investigating Mr. Hariri’s murder on February 14, 2005, this rift with Syria resulted in hostile 
confrontations between Syria and several Lebanese regime members, as well as Mr. Hariri’s assassination 
by car bomb in the streets of Beirut. At present, as the result of the 2004 decision by the Lebanese 
Parliament, Mr. LaHoud still retains the office of President of the Republic of Lebanon. LEBANON 
FACTBOOK, supra note 14.  
126 LEB. CONST. TIT. 2 CH. 4 ART 50 (2005). 
127 Id. at art. 52 
128 Id. at art. 53 
129 Id. at art. 65. 
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 Electoral laws are the backbone to free participation in government and an open 
society. In Lebanon, all Lebanese who are age 21 or over are given the franchise, as long 
as they are not subject to a legal penalty130 (i.e. deprivation of rights as punishment131 or 
an established state of mental insanity132) and are not part of the military or any other 
national policing body.133 Eligible voters are registered to vote in their assigned 
geographical electoral districts by religious sect,134 and must identify themselves by 
name, address, and religion when going to the polls to vote.135 There are established 
mechanisms of governmental oversight of persons who are on voting lists and their status 
as eligible voters, and these lists must be compared prior to any election.136 
B. Personal Status Laws 
 Under the terms of the Lebanese constitution, all Lebanese are “children” of the 
nation and enjoy the same rights, regardless of confession.137 However, the Lebanese 
personal status laws illustrate the disconnect between constitutional imperatives and the 
reality of law and society in Lebanon. Secular courts in Lebanon,138 which are tasked 
with certain limited functions (many of these having to do with governmental and 
constitutional oversight), figure heavily in Lebanese jurisprudence.139 It is important to 
 
130 LOI ELECTORAL PARLIMENTAIRE, ch. 2 art. 9 (2005)  
131 Id. at arts. 9, 10 (the most common cause of legal deprivation of the franchise is the violation of the 
Lebanese Criminal Code provisions). 
132 Id. at art. 9.  
133 Id. at art. 28. 
134 Id. at art. 4 
135 Id. at art. 13. 
136 LOI ELECTORAL PARLIMENTAIRE, ch. 2 arts. 17 – 27 (2005). 
137 LEB. CONST. PREAMBLE, TIT. 1 (A) (2005). 
138 The jurisdiction of secular courts in Lebanon is further subdivided into criminal and civil jurisdiction 
generally, with separate, secular military courts existing for limited questions of military law as well. See 
JUDICIARY: LEBANON, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE IN 
THE ARAB REGION (POGAR), available at http://www.pogar.org/countries/judiciary.asp?cid=9 (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2005). 
139 See Suleiman Takieddine, An Independent Judiciary for a Better Justice in OPTIONS FOR LEBANON 30 – 
34 (Nawaf Salam ed. 2004) (describing the divisions within the secular court structure in Lebanon). 
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note that religious communities form their own councils and governmental bodies for 
their communities in addition to administering religious courts.140 
Religious courts in Lebanon are barred from trying cases brought pursuant to 
Lebanese penal laws, as well as certain civil cases.141 While it is possible for a person to 
change his religious sect, religious courts will assume that they have jurisdiction over a 
person if they have jurisdiction over the person’s father by virtue of his religious 
affiliation.142 If the father changes his religious affiliation and his child has yet to reach 
the legal age of majority, the father’s new religion has jurisdiction over both the father 
and his children.143 In cases where the litigants belong to different religions, jurisdiction 
shifts to secular courts.144 
One of the primary areas of jurisprudence for religious courts is marriage, and 
subsidiary questions arising from marriage-related issues. It is in these areas that there is 
a disparity between the laws and requirements for Christians of various sects (not to 
mention Jews and Muslims)145; for example, Catholic and Orthodox communities have 
slightly different requirements for marital capacity,146 and their interpretation of what 
voids a marriage and the effects of a void marriage on any children of that marriage differ 
vastly.147 Christian communities also differ in their requirements for establishing valid 
 
140 Bachir Bilani, Ibrahim Najjar, Antoine El-Gemayel, Personal Status in THE LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 
vol. I 267 (Antoine El-Gemayel ed 1985). 
141 Id. at 268. 
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Bachir Bilani, Ibrahim Najjar, Antoine El-Gemayel, Personal Status in THE LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 
vol. I 276 (Antoine El-Gemayel ed 1985) (explaining that Catholic courts will find a lack of capacity when 
there is some element of “feigning” involved in consent to marry  - such as a lack of intent to remain 
faithful to one’s spouse during the marriage or to procreate during the marriage – while “[a]ccording to the 
Christian Orthodox and Evangelical sects, coercion or seduction only will nullify consent.”). 
147 Id. at 276 – 77, 296 – 300, 306 – 312. 
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parentage, recognition of children, and adoption of children.148 Religious status also 
impacts on the inheritance and gift-giving rights of Lebanese in both life and death.149 
C. Property Law 
 Regardless of their religion, landowning Lebanese are required to register their 
land with their local government,150 subject to an official assessment of the land by a 
surveyor.151 All landowners receive the same rights in and to their property,152 subject to 
the general interests of society in the use of the property and the ability of the government 
to take the property for cause and with compensation to the property owner.153 Disputes 
regarding landownership,154 and the ability to use the right of usufruct155 are governed by 
secular Lebanese courts, except to the extent that inheritance laws are involved.156 
D. Criminal Law 
 All Lebanese are subject to the criminal code regardless of their religious 
affiliation or status.157 The criminal code makes distinctions between crimes which 
qualify as “major offenses”158 and those which are essentially misdemeanor offenses159;
crimes that are classified as political are subject to a different set of mens rea 
requirements and punishment standards than those imposed for major offenses and 
 
148 See id. 321 – 334. 
149 See id. 349 – 51, 363 – 77. 
150 Edward Eid, Antoine El-Gemayel, Real Property in THE LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM vol. I 205 (Antoine 
El-Gemayel ed. 1985). 
151 Id. at 208. 
152 Id. at 221 – 223. 
153 Id. at 223 – 227. 
154 Id. at 233 – 234. 
155 Id. at 238 – 243. This right under Lebanese law is analogous to usufruct in American law, which is 
defined as: “[a] right to use another’s property for a time without damaging or diminishing it, although the 
property might naturally deteriorate over time.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (7th ed. 1999). 
156 See supra Part II.C.2.B. 
157 Samir Alyeh, Criminal Law and Procedure in THE LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM vol. I 396 (Antoine El-
Gemayel ed. 1985). 
158 Id.
159 Id.
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misdemeanors.160 Criminal trials start at the lower court level,161 and their adjudicative 
results can be appealed up a chain of appellate courts as applicable for outcome only and 
not sentencing,162 except in the case of military court decisions, which have a separate 
appellate procedure.163 There is a limited right to counsel at certain points in the 
adjudicative and questioning process, subject to the rights of the examining magistrate 
during the initial investigative proceeding.164 
D. Possibilities for the future 
 As the previous sections have illustrated, there is a clear disconnect between 
constitutional provisions, laws, and societal practices in Lebanon. The constitution itself 
decries confessionalism in politics, yet at the same time enshrines voting procedures 
which institutionalize religious voting segregation.165 Electoral laws provide the franchise 
based solely on citizenship status and capacity, however voters are registered by religion 
and must identify themselves by such when they vote.166 Criminal and civil laws of the 
Lebanese nation are applied to all Lebanese alike, yet intimate personal legal issues are 
subject to the requirements of religious courts and bodies except in rare circumstances 
which cross the communal divide.167 Lebanese property law provides for equal 
protections of landowners regardless of religion, unless it intersects with questions of 
inheritance, which are the province of religious courts.168 These differences and 
 
160 Id.
161 Id. at 400 – 01. 
162 Id. at 406. 
163 Samir Alyeh, Criminal Law and Procedure in THE LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM vol. I 401 (Antoine El-
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164 Id. at 404. 
165 See supra Part II.C.1, 2. 
166 See supra Part II.C.2.A. 
167 See supra Part II.C.2.D. 
168 See supra Part II.C.2.B, C. 
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contradictions only further serve to divide Lebanese Christian communities themselves, 
not to mention Lebanese society as a whole. 
 There are many historical reasons for the legal divide between Christian and 
Muslim communities in Lebanon, and indeed a call to radically change this practice is not 
only unrealistic, but also potentially dangerous given the presence of Hizbollah169 and 
other terrorist groups which have used Lebanese internal weaknesses to create instability 
in the region in the past and continue their attempts to do so.170 However, this is not 
necessarily a bad thing for the current and future state of Lebanon, and its Christian and 
Muslim populations.  
At present, there is a divide between nations fighting the war on terror and Middle 
Eastern countries, whose response to the war varies from the more aggressive pursuit of 
terrorists,171 to countries which are much more likely to pay lip service to the idea of 
stopping terrorists than to take concrete action to stop them.172 This is certainly a political 
and cultural divide, which in many cases is mirrored in the structure of legal, or at least 
tacit, legitimization of terror groups in the electoral process.173 In the morass of intra-
national and inter-Arab debate over terrorism and Islamist concepts, there are very few 
 
169 For a brief explanation of the origins of Hizbollah, see generally BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra 
note 14. 
170 See LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14. In fact, Hizbollah has become such an entrenched presence in 
the Lebanese political sphere that, for the first time, an open member of Hizbollah was elected to the 
Parliament and is serving as a minister. See “Lebanon Reborn? Defining National Priorities and Prospects 
for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14, 2005,” Panel I of a Hearing of the House International 
Relations Committee, Federal News Service (Jul. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos). This 
ministerial appointment has drawn sharp criticism, especially from the United States, which is unable to 
meet with any members of Hizbollah, in accordance with its policies regarding giving even tacit 
recognition to terrorist groups. See id.(statement of C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs).  
171 Egypt, for example, has been fighting the Muslim Brotherhood for years. See generally CARRIE 
ROSEFSKY WICKHAM, MOBILIZING ISLAM: RELIGION, ACTIVISM, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN EGYPT 
(2002). 
172 See infra Part III (discussing Syria). 
173 Again, Egypt is a primary example of this despite its long-time ban on political participation by the 
Muslim Brotherhood. See generally WICKHAM, supra note 171. 
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state-based ways to offer interested Muslims a way out of conflict without engendering 
suspicion from outside forces and their co-religionists. However, the situation of the 
Lebanese Christian communities presents such an opportunity for Muslims, as well as for 
the Christian communities themselves. 
The legal framework for religious tolerance in Lebanon already exists. At the 
same time, there exists a legislative power structure in which Christians could take 
centralized control of their assigned governmental segments, as well as the appointment 
powers given to the President (provided that the president himself was not a Syrian 
pawn). Using these constitutional powers, a united Christian block could start taking 
corrective measures to rid Lebanon of Syrian presence and the presence of Hizbollah and 
other such terror groups operating in Lebanon. With the attention garnered by the 
assassination of Rafik Hariri,174 and the subsequent attempts on the lives of other anti-
Syrian voices,175 Lebanese Christians and Muslims began vocal protests which resulted in 
at least the superficial withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.176 The withdrawal, 
however, did not remove Syrian influence from Lebanon, and certainly did nothing to 
stop terrorist groups from using Lebanon as a training ground and bank through which to 
launder ill-gotten funds. Currently, intelligence, military, and security analysts attest to 
Lebanon’s role in terrorism,177 and members of both parties on Capitol Hill are adopting 
 
174 See BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra note 14. 
175 See id.
176 JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 244 – 249 (detailing recent Syrian actions to manipulate domestic Lebanese 
politics from the local level upwards, as well as Lebanese foreign policy in regards to its relationship with 
Israel). 
177 See, e.g., Hearing of the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack Subcommittee of the House 
Homeland Security Committee on WMD Terrorism and Proliferent States, Federal News Service (Sept. 8, 
2005) (statement of Dr. Daniel Byman, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University); 
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Prospects for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14, 2005,” Panel I of a Hearing of the House 
International Relations Committee, Federal News Service (Jul. 28, 2005) (statement of James Kunder, 
25
these views as fact.178 At the same time, a study of legislative proposals and enactments 
since September 11, 2001 indicates that the U.S. government is increasingly willing to 
provide Lebanon with resources to build peaceful institutions,179 and, especially in the 
days after Hariri’s assassination, a bi-partisan chorus was heard essentially 
acknowledging that Lebanon is not a willing participant in Syria’s policies and calling for 
a stronger and independent Lebanon.180 
If the Lebanese Christian communities decided to act as a block, rather than 
breaking down along confessional lines, they could elect MPs who would act in concert 
(and it is the belief of the author that at least some Sunni members would go along with 
this to avenge Hariri). Legal protection of religious beliefs already exists in Lebanese 
statutory law,181 and the Christian communities would still be able to maintain their own 
 
Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development); “Lebanon 
Reborn? Defining National Priorities and Prospects for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14, 
2005,” Panel II of a Hearing of the House International Relations Committee, Federal News Service (Jul. 
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4606 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist); 151 CONG. REC. H. 1331 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) 
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179 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 35 (2005) (advocating, in a report from the Senate Committee on Foreign 
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infrastructural development); H. REP. NO. 663 (2002) (advocating, in a report from the House Committee 
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180 For an example of pre-Hariri assassination legislation, see Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-175 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2004). Some 
examples of Hariri assassination-based statements, see Exec. Order 13338 (May 11, 2004) (National 
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Lebanese-Israeli dispute and bringing peace on that front. See Haddad, supra note 42 (“Lebanese Christian 
respondents reveal more than 90% in favor of peace with Israel.”). The stated reasons for this desire for 
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181 See supra Part II.C. 
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personal status-based courts and councils under such an alliance182; the major change 
would be a change in mindset from thinking of oneself as a part of a separate legal 
enclave within Lebanon to thinking of oneself as a Lebanese Christian. The disconnect 
between constitutional, statutory law and tradition could, in this instance, be used to give 
the Christian communities the strength and reassurance needed to create a power block. 
In turn, the author believes that this block would be formidable enough to encourage 
further support from the international community, particularly the U.S., and, provided 
that the constitutional and statutory provisions allowing freedom of religion were not 
abridged, would pave the way for a stable and less sectarian Lebanon in the future.  
Admittedly, there is a risk that the Christian communities could attempt to 
overstep legal boundaries. However, considering the negative view taken by the 
international community to more strife in the Middle East, and the existence of Muslim 
terrorism groups in Lebanon, to say nothing of recent memories of wartime atrocities, it 
is unlikely that such a usurpation would happen. Assuming that such a usurpation did not 
happen, a Christian block would function to offer Lebanese Muslims the benefit of 
having an ideology to adhere to, while not having to splinter their own communities as 
much to get to the ideology. 
Part III. Syria 
A. Christian Communities in Syria 
 Although they do not share the notoriety of their Lebanese neighbors, Christian 
communities in Syria are just as historically based. There are several Christian groups in 
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Syria, although most literature lumps them together as “Christians.”183 It is estimated that 
10% of Syrians are Christians of some variety.184 The Greek Orthodox Patriarch for 
Antioch and All The East sits in Syria, and many religious and charitable works are 
carried out through the auspices of the Patriarchate.185 There are several Uniate churches 
in Syria, principally Syriac Catholicism,186 the Melkite Church,187 the Assyrian Church of 
the East,188 the Copts,189 the Maronites,190 as well as Roman Catholicism itself.191 One of 
the often unheard of side effects of the current Iraqi political situation is that the Christian 
Assyrians (or ChaldoAssyrians), a group which has in recent years come to rely on the 
Kurds for support and protection, are now being removed from their traditional areas by 
the Kurds and are fleeing to neighboring countries, including Syria.192 
183 See BACKGROUND NOTE: SYRIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE 
SYRIA]. 
184 See SYRIA, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sy.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2005) [hereinafter SYRIA 
FACTBOOK]. 
185 See Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA ONLINE,
available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9037927 (last visited Oct. 22, 2005); Historical 
Overview, GREEK ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST, available at 
http://antiochpat.org/english/sitefiles/viewcontent.php?content=%241%24Fqww80sV%24LJtl/mpIsne5lz0
mZ5kCy0_%241%24cY2fEC.3%242X4rjsf3DqIjEbC53bz6R/_%241%24Fqww80sV%24LJtl/mpIsne5lz0
mZ5kCy0b56a92baa0ee987eb7f7e4a179b60efb&id=1&cat=%241%24DdKoSQCb%24FO96gT8jCFwnHP
xW4LNZj1_%241%24pCxQHS8F%24GHaBW0fpsqpxYoSn4BE0M/_%241%24DdKoSQCb%24FO96gT
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iew&catname=Other%20Contents (last visited Oct. 22, 2005). 
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B. Syrian Independence and History 
 The Syrian Arab Republic was established as an independent entity in 1946,193 
and has remained such until the present day, with a slight interruption in independence 
occurring during the ill-fated attempt at Egyptian and Syrian unity, the United Arab 
Republic.194 Its constitution was not promulgated until 1973.195 The religious 
composition of Syria at its founding did not mirror the levels of equality experienced in 
Lebanon; the majority of the population was Muslim, with Sunnis being the dominant 
sect.196 
During the early part of Syria’s existence, there was political instability and 
infighting among groups vying for governmental primacy, however political dominance 
started to coalesce in the 1960s and 1970s with the creation and rise to prominence of the 
Ba’ath party.197 Though widely viewed today through the lens of Saddam Hussein’s 
Ba’athist state in Iraq, and the Assad state in Syria, it is interesting to note that one of the 
fathers of Ba’athism was himself a Greek Orthodox, who established the party as a way 
to promote pan-Arab unity.198 The intent of the Ba’ath party was initially secular, with 
the unifying element being a shared Arab ethnicity rather than religion.199 
At the same time that Ba’athism was coming to prominence in Syria, so too were 
the Muslim minority Alawis, who were easily outnumbered by Sunnis.200 Alawi leaders 
began insinuating themselves in the Ba’ath party, as well as governmental and military 
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apparatuses, and ultimately were able consolidate power and take control of Syria under 
Hafiz al-Assad.201 From 1970 until his death in 2000, Hafiz al-Assad ruled Syria under 
the guise of being the elected President and Ba’ath party leader.202 In the wake of Hafiz 
al-Assad’s death, his second son, Bashir al-Assad, was elected President of Syria in a 
move which required a constitutional amendment lowering the age of eligibility for the 
office of President.203 Despite his stated desire to bring Syria into the modern world,204 
Bashir al-Assad’s presidency has thus far been known for its ties to many terrorist 
groups,205 political repression following a brief period of opening,206 and, most recently, 
its role in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri – the 
increasingly anti-Syrian figure discussed in Part II of this article.207 
In terms of Lebanese relations, Syria has considered Lebanon to be a rightful part 
of its territory since its founding,208 and has not shied away from saying that its 
separation from Lebanon is essentially illegal.209 Indeed, the language of the Syrian 
constitution preamble clearly reflects both this belief and the Ba’athist belief that the 
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partition of the Middle East was illegal.210 Syrian claims to rights over the domestic 
situation in Lebanon only increased with the power of Israel, and often Syria and Israel 
have used Lebanon as a battleground in their own disputes.211 The Lebanese civil war 
proved a situation ripe for Syrian intervention, and throughout the decades of war the 
Syrian regime did just that, although it intervened for different sides at different times, 
and was no more averse to providing support to Christian fighters than to Hizbollah 
during the course of the conflict.212 
The years of ceasefire in Lebanon have not seen a relaxing of Syrian control.213 
There is perhaps no better evidence of this than the Hariri incident, which has raised the 
specter of Syrian secret police control over Lebanon and its political actors to an 
international frenzy.214 No longer the elephant in the room of Middle Eastern diplomacy, 
the Hariri assassination, and the public outcry and investigation which followed, has 
brought Syrian tactics to the forefront of world politics. In a global atmosphere which 
widely regards Syria as implicated in nefarious forms of financing and terrorism, this 
controversy has created a weakened position for the current Syrian regime. 
C. Syrian Constitutional and Statutory Law 
1. Constitutional Law 
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 The current provisions of the Syrian constitution were enacted in 1973.215 Much 
of the constitutional preamble deals with Ba’athist goals and beliefs, enshrining pan-
Arabism as the preeminent constitutional and political principle in Syria.216 Theoretically, 
Syria is “a democratic, popular, socialist, and sovereign state,”217 to be run as a 
republic.218 Further, Islam is declared the primary provider of Syrian legislation,219 and, 
although a state religion is not provided for in the constitution, “[t]he religion of the 
President of the Republic has to be Islam.”220 At the same time, the constitution also 
provides that “[t]he freedom of faith is guaranteed. The state respects all religions,”221 
and “[t]he state guarantees the freedom to hold any religious rites, provided they do not 
disturb public order.”222 Thus, religious rights are both protected and circumscribed by a 
subjective constitutional standard. 
 Much of the Syrian constitution reflects the strong affiliation which existed 
between Syria and communist countries prior to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.223 The role 
of socialism in framing the Syrian legal system is particularly evident in the 
constitutional provisions regarding categories of allowed ownership,224 and the rights of 
owners of real and personal property in their belongings225; the right of the state to 
appropriate personal funds and belongings is also set out in the constitution.226 
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Interestingly, the Syrian constitution’s plain meaning expresses a respect for the 
individual in criminal matters227 and specifically states that “[n]o one may be tortured 
physically or mentally or . . . be treated in a humiliating manner.”228 These tenets are 
applied more stringently in word than in practice under the Syrian regime according to 
official reports.229 Again highlighting the disconnect between constitutional jurisprudence 
and practices of the Syrian regime, the constitution guarantees “[e]very citizen . . . the 
right to freely and openly express his views in words, in writing, and through all other 
means of expression. . . . The state guarantees the freedom of the press, of printing, and 
publication in accordance with the law.”230 The right to publicly gather and protest is also 
guaranteed in the Syrian constitution, tempered by the express proviso that “[t]he law 
regulates the exercise of this right.”231 
Electoral districts are defined under Syrian constitutional law as being formed by 
a set number of peasants and workers per area, and are not drawn according to sectarian 
affiliations.232 Nominally, the People’s Assembly – the Syrian legislative branch – has 
wide-ranging constitutional powers,233 however in reality the associates of the Assad 
regimes have wielded these powers from within legislative and ministerial circles.234 The 
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constitution sets out many powers for the President as well,235 including a place on the 
Syrian Supreme Court236 and the High Council of the Judiciary.237 
2. Syrian Statutory Law 
Constitutional protections aside, all Syrians are entitled to suffrage from age 18 
onwards,238 as long as they are not members of the military or police forces,239 or 
immigrants to Syria.240 Despite these protections, Syrians lack the ability to directly 
change their government at the federal level under the electoral law,241 and have the most 
open electoral options at the most basic levels of political elections.242 
In terms of personal status, Syrian law recognizes the same set of religious courts 
for determining status-based questions as does Lebanese law.243 These courts fit into a 
judicial structure in Syria which is heavily linked to the regime at the helm.244 
The constitution is essentially ineffective in the face of emergency laws which 
have been in effect for decades in Syria245; these rules include the applicability of marital 
law to the general population, especially political protesters and dissidents.246 
Additionally, the emergency laws are routinely used in Syria to control the media and its 
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messages.247 During an attempted reformation of Syria’s laws in 2005, the Assad 
government promulgated rules purporting to require that the prosecutorial body involved 
in holding prisoners state a reason for the detention within five days of the onset of the 
detention248; importantly, however, security and terrorism related crimes do not fall under 
the terms of these legal changes.249 
None of these laws are directed at religious groups in particular, as the focus of 
the state is more the control of the population as a whole – especially given the status of 
the ruling Alawi elite as a minority religion within the Syrian Muslim population. The 
state apparatus has made itself into an all-encompassing bureaucracy in order to 
subjugate the religious and class differences which existed from the time of Syrian 
independence onwards, and has at least facially completed part of its task.250 
D. Possibilities for the future 
 The strength of the Christian communities in Syria is difficult to assess because of 
the lack of information available, however it is clear that there are such communities 
involved in active worship and religious works.251 It is also clear that the forced 
migration of Assyrians from Iraq to Syria is an evolving situation252 which, over time, 
could result in a political issue for the Syrian regime, as well as Syrian Christian leaders.  
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 While tensions might not be overtly brewing within Syrian Christian 
communities, the increasing international scrutiny on the Assad government could easily 
lead to greater disturbances in the social and political order in Syria, which in turn could 
cause sectarianism to come to the forefront of Syrian politics, as an issue in Muslim and 
Christian communities. Given these considerations, it is important to note that analysts 
and U.S. lawmakers have steadily increased their stated beliefs that Syria has been and 
continues to be a source of support for terrorist groups,253 their financiers and arms 
providers,254 a place of severe political repression,255 and a state involved in repeated 
incursions into the sovereignty of Lebanon.256 The Hariri controversy may be the most 
visible chapter in this escalation of international hostilities with the Syrian regime, 
however the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 
enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President257 is an indication that 
skepticism about the propriety of the Syrian position in Lebanon existed before the death 
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of Hariri, and will continue on after the conclusion of the investigation into his 
assassination.  
 In this context, Syrian Christian communities stand in a position to influence not 
only their status, but also the future of Syria by taking action to undermine the Assad 
regime, at the most extreme, or at least to enforce their constitutional rights and force the 
abrogation of emergency and statutory laws which serve only to abridge the rights 
guaranteed to all Syrians under the constitution. Certainly, there is risk involved in this 
course of action, and perhaps the best way to encourage this type of agitation is through 
members of the Syrian diaspora living abroad, as well as funding and legislative actions 
by the U.S. and its allies to assist these communities. By creating a shared identity 
outside of the state apparatus, Syrian Christians would create a way to circumvent 
repressive politics while at the same time acting confidently in their constitutional rights 
and privileges. With adequate support, this could prompt regime changes which would 
open society for all Syrians and stop Syrian incursions into Lebanon, thus further raising 
the international prestige of Syria as a whole and promoting greater regional stability.  
 In this context, Lebanese and Syrian Christian communities would do best to 
work in tandem to promote their agendas within the legal frameworks which protect them 
in their respective countries. The current disconnect between the provisions of the 
Lebanese and Syrian constitutions and their respective statutory laws is not 
insurmountable, especially as constitutions tend to engender a more exalted status in 
society than do legislatively promulgated laws, which can be more easily done away 
with.  
Part IV. Conclusion 
37
 This article has discussed the Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria, as 
well as the legal protections guaranteed for citizens of Lebanon and Syria under their 
respective constitutional and statutory laws. Emphasis has been placed on certain aspects 
of legal life in both countries, as the author believes that these areas are key testing 
grounds for the connection between constitutional protections and everyday life – and in 
this test both countries fail. Brief historical sketches have been offered in order to provide 
a background for the religious and legal discussions of the article, and also to illustrate 
why Christian communities in these countries would function best when they function as 
a co-religionist block rather than within the framework of their own sects.  
 Admittedly, the courses of action advocated in this article would require all 
communities to put away sectarian interests, which is much more easily advocated than 
achieved in reality. However, the reality of the current political situation in the Middle 
East, and international relations as a whole, is changing to the point where alliances with 
groups which share at least some communal interests are becoming more necessary than 
in the post-World War II era of self-determination and group segregation for statehood 
purposes. Both legally and politically, now is the time for Christian communities in 
Lebanon and Syria to come together to help reshape their states in ways which previous 
conflicts have not allowed. The story of Babel, reflected in modern Christian community 
conflicts such as that experienced in Lebanon, is a constant reminder of what happens 
when societies divide over a common aim; it is hoped that a bringing together of 
Christian communities may take them from the ruin of collapse and failure to a path 
towards a state which embraces its enunciated respect for religious freedom.  
